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SYMPOSIUM:
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
The 1980 U.N. Commission
on Human Rights and the Disappeared
David Kramer and David Weissbrodt
When the public debate began at the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights on the question of disappeared persons, the atmosphere in
the huge assembly hall was tense and expectant. The public gallery was
jammed with the wives and families of those persons who had been "dis-
appeared"-arrested, tortured, imprisoned, or possibly killed by govern-
ments which refused to admit any knowledge or responsibility. The con-
cerned audience came from all over the world. A few had even been dis-
appeared themselves, but had managed to escape. They had haunted the
halls and corridors of the Palais des Nations in Geneva since the beginning
of the Commission; every delegate felt their presence and their desire for
the United Nations to do something about their lost loved ones.
On a United Nations time scale, the phenomenon of disappearances
was a relatively new issue. The General Assembly had first considered it
on 20 December 1978 by expressing its concern and recognizing the
urgency of the problem.1 The next year, in March 1979, the issue of
disappearances was included on the agenda of the Human Rights Com-
mission, but was given such low priority that time expired before it could
be debated. It was simply postponed until the 1980 session.2 In the year's
interim, international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) performed
an immense job of publicizing the issue and creating international
pressure for meaningful action by the Human Rights Commission.
1. United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 173, Official Records Suppl. 45 (A/33)
1978, p. 158.
2. Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Decision 15(XXXV) Official
Records Suppl.6 (E/1979/36, E/CN.4/1347) 1979, p. 137.
3. Economic and Social Council Resolution 34, Official Records Suppl. 1 (E/1979/79),
p. 26.
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Sub-Commission Recommendations
In May 1979, the Economic and Social Council requested that the Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Mi-
norities consider the subject of disappearances in order to make recom-
mendations to the Commission on Human rights.3 The Sub-Commission
is comprised of twenty-six human rights experts from around the world,
who are able to take positions without overt interference by their re-
spective governments; the Sub-Commission has played an important
creative role in U.N. human rights work. The U.N. Human Rights Commis-
sion, in contrast, is made up of representatives of forty-three nations and
is an overtly political body with a central role in the human rights field.
The Sub-Commission adopted resolution 5B(XXXII) of 5 September 1979
in which it pointed out "that the danger involved for such [disappeared]
persons warrants urgent action on the part of all individuals and institu-
tions. . . ."4 It suggested that the extreme gravity of the phenomenon of
disappearances "would justify envisaging some form of emergency
remedy." 5 Finally, a study entitled Report of the Expert on the Question
of the Fate of Missing and Disappeared Persons in Chile, had been sub-
mitted to the General Assembly on 21 November 1979 and was well
received. 6 It recommended that "careful consideration" should be given
to establishing particular measures at the United Nations level to respond
rapidly and effectively "to disappearances." 7
By the time of the 1980 session of the Human Rights Commission,
disappearances had emerged from the netherworld of nonrecognition,
but had not yet become crusted over with political or ideological affilia-
tions that would make passage of a resolution impossible. The issue of
disappearances was ripe for action by the Commission.
The overwhelming concern of the family members of the disappeared
as well as the NGOs was not whether the Commission would act, but
what the nature of that action would be. The experience of the most
active NGOs-Amnesty International, the International Commission of
Jurists, and the International League for Human Rights-strongly indicated
that the first several days after the initial arrest of a person were the most
crucial. In cases in which NGOs had been successful in directing inter-
national attention immediately toward the government concerned, they
had had significant success in protecting the disappeared person from
torture or other mistreatment, and even in causing persons to "reappear."
4. Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities Resolution 5B (E/CN.4
Sub.2/435, E/CN.4/1350) 1979, p. 50, para. 1.
5. Ibid., p. 5.
6. Economic and Social Council, Official Records Suppl. 3 (A/34/583/Add.1) 1979.
7. Ibid., p. 197.
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The debate was expected to center around the question of whether the
Commission should set up a mechanism that could deal with individual
cases of disappearances on an emergency basis.8
PREPARATIONS FOR THE PUBLIC DEBATE
Long before the public debate on disappearances began, the Commis-
sion delegates present had been conducting intense, private negotiations.
The issue seemed too new, uncertain, and potentially explosive to be
handled entirely within the cumbersome procedures of formal debate.
The U.S. delegation had come prepared to take a strong stand in
ensuring an effective U.N. mechanism to respond to disappearances. The
Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House of Representa-
tives had recently conducted hearings on the problem of disappeared
persons.9 Congress was in the process of passing a resolution that called
on the President to "encourage the leaders of other countries to join with
him in calling upon the United Nations . . .to establish effective pro-
cedures for dealing with cases of disappeared persons. ."..".10 Many of
the other Western governments had taken similar positions.
This strong interest in the issue of disappearances among all the
Western delegates caused difficulties as the delegates squabbled among
themselves to determine who would take a leadership role in formulating
and sponsoring a resolution on disappearances. France, having come to
the Commission with a prepared draft resolution, took the initiative. The
French proposed that a group of three experts acting in their individual
capacities would examine all reports of disappearances in any part of the
world. The experts would be empowered to seek information from the
governments and families concerned, and to take appropriate action, in
consultation with the governments concerned.
The full text of the draft was as follows:
The Commission on Human Rights,
Bearing. in mind General Assembly resolution 33/173 of 20 December
1978, which requested the Commission on Human Rights to consider the
question of missing or disappeared persons with a view to making appropriate
recommendations,
8. Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights (NGO/283) 1980.
9. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights and The Phe-
nomenon of Disappearances, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Or-
ganizations, 96th Cong., 1st. sess., (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1979).
10. Ibid., p. 632; U.S., Congress, House, Resolution 285, 96th Cong., 2d sess., 1980.
U.N. Commission on Human Rights
Taking into account resolution 1979/38 of the Economic and Social
Council, which requested the Commission to consider the question as a
matter of priority, and resolution 5B(XXXII) of the Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
Convinced that the elimination of enforced or involuntary disappearances
requires a systematic effort on the part of the international community and
on the part of Governments,
1. Invites the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with its Chair-
man, three experts of international standing in their individual capacities, to
study and examine all reports and information which come to their attention
concerning enforced or involuntary disappearances of persons in any part of
the world;
2. Requests the experts to seek all available information concerning en-
forced or involuntary disappearances from the Governments and families
concerned, and to take appropriate action, in consultation with the Govern-
ments concerned, to promote the implementation of the provisions of
General Assembly resolution 33/173 and other United Nations resolutions
relevant to the situation of missing or disappeared persons;
3. Decides that the experts should choose their working methods in such
a way as to ensure the necessary speed and flexibility of action in responding
to urgent situations.
4. Requests the experts to submit to the Commission at each session a
report on their activities, together with their conclusions and recommenda-
tions;
5. Requests all Governments, specialized agencies, regional intergovern-
mental organizations and non-governmental organizations to cooperate with
and assist the experts in the performance of their task;
6. Further requests Governments, at the request of the experts:
(a) To inform the experts without delay of cases in which they are
unable to locate immediately or following a brief investigation either a
person whose abduction or arrest has been reported to them or a person who
has been reported missing and may be presumed to have been the victim of
such acts;
(b) To inform the experts without delay of any facts established and any
progress made and conclusions drawn in the course of investigations opened
in cases of enforced or involuntary disappearances;
7. Also requests Governments, when they are presented with reliable
reports on cases of enforced or involuntary disappearances, to undertake
without delay impartial investigations into the whereabouts or fate of the
missing or disappeared person and the identity of the abductors;
8. Urges the Secretary-General to continue to use his good offices in cases
of enforced or involuntary disappearances of persons;
9. Urgently requests the Secretary-General to provide the experts with all
necessary assistance in particular the staff and resources they require in
order to perform their functions in an effective and expeditious manner;
10. Decides to continue consideration of this question at its thirty-seventh
session.
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Western Bloc Reservations
The Western bloc reached agreement on all the provisions contained
in the draft except for paragraph 6(a), which defined disappeared persons.
To several of the Western countries-the United States, Canada, Australia,
and the Netherlands-broadly defining disappeared persons as those who
cannot be located immediately or following a brief investigation once an
abduction was reported to the government was an open invitation to
other countries to find the resolution imprecise and unworkable. The
definition seemed to cover all missing persons, instead of all disappeared
persons. It did not exclude a voluntary disappearance by someone who,
for personal reasons, might wish to hide from the authorities or perhaps
from their family. Nor did it exclude those cases in which it was thought
that a person had voluntarily left the country. Yet the French insisted on
their language.
The Western group was also haggling about which countries would
be listed as cosponsors of the resolution. At first, all wanted to be co-
sponsors. As the fighting over the language of the draft continued, the
number eventually dropped down to six cosponsors, and then four, and
finally one, France.
The Western bloc had decided that it was necessary for them to take
the initiative in proposing a resolution on disappearances. They were
unable, however, to draft a suitable resolution. They argued among
themselves late into the night, and because no agreement was reached,
there was no text with which to approach nonaligned nations in an effort
to get their support. This disagreement continued late into the third
week.
The Western strategy was a serious miscalcuiation of the amount of
support for a strong resolution on disappearances that existed among
nonaligned nations. During the first week of the Commission, the NGO
Special Committee on Human Rights in Geneva had hosted a meeting to
informally discuss the question of disappearances. All delegates and NGOs
were invited. The interest shown by the delegates was substantial. Despite
the fact that the United States had scheduled a reception at the same
time as the meeting, nineteen governments attended-almost half of the
forty-three country membership of the Commission. Nine nonaligned
countries, including Algeria and Iraq, attended. Even the USSR showed
some interest in the meeting.
The overall context of the Commission may help explain why the
United States and other Western nations did not make stronger overtures
to those Third World countries which had shown interest in the issue of
disappearances. For the last several years, the first weeks of the Commis-
sion session have become predictable. The question of the Occupied
Territories is discussed, and Israel is condemned. Apartheid is discussed,
U.N. Commission on Human Rights
and South Africa is condemned. More recently, the right to economic
development by the nonaligned nations is discussed, and some developed
nations are chastised. At this session of the Commission, however, France
and the United States broke this routine by introducing two new issues:
the invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR, and the Soviet government's
violation of the human rights of Nobel laureate Andrei Sakharov. Both
issues created a situation of confrontation between the superpowers:
many observers referred to the return of a Cold War atmosphere. Symbolic
of the confrontational atmosphere were the initial instructions to the
delegates of the United States not to fraternize with the delegates of the
USSR. This instruction required special effort because the delegations
were physically separated by only a few feet. Later in the session this
instruction was withdrawn by the U.S. State Department. After delaying
the Commission for several days of debate, a resolution was passed that
condemned the invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR. The discussion of
Sakharov was tabled to a later agenda item, and was eventually post-
poned without action until the 1981 session of the Human Rights Com-
mission, because neither side was certain as to its support on a substantive
vote.
Perhaps the tensions that had been created by the initiatives of the
United States made it difficult for the Western bloc to consult with
nonaligned and socialist nations on the disappearance issue, or perhaps
the Western bloc, somewhat isolated by the confrontations that had
occurred, simply assumed that it would need to take the initiative in
order to move the issue forward.
The indecision of the Western bloc created a vacuum which Argentina
tried to fill with a resolution of its own. That country-continually accused
by the NGOs of being the worst perpetrator of disappearances1 1-was the
country most vehemently against the creation of any new U.N. mechanism
for dealing with disappearances. Argentina's resolution urged governments
to inform the Secretary-General of the measures they were adopting to
cope with the problem of disappearances. It called upon governments to
express their opinion as to what procedures might be appropriate to deal
with disappeared persons without encroaching upon the sovereignty of
any nation. A working group of five persons would then meet a week
before the 1981 session of the Human Rights Commission to evaluate the
submissions of the government and to make appropriate recommenda-
tions to the Commission. The Argentine proposal, essentially postponing
any action for at least a year, was circulated just before the beginning of
public debate.
11. Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights, Violations of Human -Rights in
Argentina (New York: Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights, 1979).
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THE PUBLIC DEBATE
On 22 February 1980 at the end of the third week of the Commission
session, the public debate on disappearances began. The Western nations
had still not agreed among themselves on the text of a resolution. The
nonaligned nations were still reacting to the Argentine proposal. The
socialist bloc was waiting to see what the nonaligned countries would do.
As a consequence, no nation was prepared to speak.
The floor then unexpectedly went to the NGOs. The representative of
Amnesty International (AI) spoke first. He defined the nature of the
problem and described Al's efforts in collecting and submitting to the
United Nations thousands ot names of disappeared persons in Argentina,
Afghanistan, Democratic Kampuchea, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and Uganda. 12
He then proceeded to discuss the case of two Argentines, who had been
disappeared, tortured, and imprisoned in a secret camp, but who had
escaped to tell of their experiences. Argentina harshly interrupted the
speech and demanded to know from the Chairman what right an NGO
had to attack a government in front of the Commission. 13 The repre-
sentative from Uruguay supported Argentina and denounced Al for
attacking a government during the Commission session. Ethiopia also
spoke against Al, accusing it of making false representations against
Argentina, based solely on Western media reports. Canada and the United
States came to the defense of Al in particular and NGOs in general,
arguing that NGOs could not separate a discussion of particular instances
of disappearances in various countries from a discussion of disappearances
in general. The United States pointed out that NGOs had been allowed to
mention specific countries during the discussion of previous items on the
agenda and that the contribution of NGOs to the understanding of the
phenomenon of disappearances had been particularly valuable. The Chair,
Waleed M. Sadi of Jordan, ruled that although NGOs may not attack
particular countries, they may provide the Commission with information
about particular countries.14 This ruling allowed Al and the other NGOs
to continue presenting their "information" to the Commission.
The representative of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)
stated that, because of the amount of information the NGOs had brought
to light, governments could no longer deny that they had knowledge
concerning the fate of disappeared persons. There was a need for the
Human Rights Commission to receive sufficient information on all cases
from all sources. The ICJ representative pointed out that thousands of
12. Amnesty International, "The Question of Disappeared Persons: Oral Statement at the
36th Session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights," mimeographed 1980.
13. Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights (E/1980/13/Add.1,
E/CN.4/1408 Add.1) 1980, p. 129.
14. Ibid., p. 130.
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families of disappeared persons were anxious that the Commission take
some action. The International League for Human Rights outlined the
emergency procedures other organizations had taken to cope with the
phenomenon of disappearances.15 The United Nations was urged to adopt
similar measures.
This initial public debate of 22 February 1980 revealed several things
about how the issue of disappearance was to fare before the Human
Rights Commission. First, the debate exemplified just how critical the
issue was for countries-such as Argentina-accused of disappearing
persons. Second, the public debate disclosed a strategy that might defeat
any action to establish a U.N. mechanism for handling disappearances. It
was clear that the NGOs, which seemed to be primarily Western in
orientation, advocated an effective resolution. It was also clear that they
had the full support of the Western nations. If the initiative surrounding
the issue of disappearances was viewed as Western there was a significant
danger that, for that reason alone, Third World countries might not
support it. Clearly, no resolution could pass the Commission without the
support of a good number of Third World nations.
The Role of Nonaligned Nations
The Third World caucused later in the day. Their discussion of disap-
pearances was general and not tied to the language of any draft The
sense of the meeting was that although the caucus members were not
prepared to gloss over the problem of disappearances as Argentina pro-
posed, neither were they prepared to accept the strong and open-ended
mechanism for responding to disappearances which the Western bloc's
draft proposed.
Monday, February 25, the beginning of the fourth week of the Com-
mission session, was the deadline for the introduction of all proposed
resolutions concerning the issue of disappearances. Therefore, France
briefly took the floor and introduced its draft resolution, although that
resolution lacked the support of even the Western nations. 16 No other
resolutions were introduced.
Responding to the needs of the Third World, the Western nations
finally ended their isolation. Later that day Australia, Canada, and the
Netherlands met with Iraq, Cuba, and Yugoslavia to ask for help. They
had come to believe that it was necessary to encourage the drafting of a
text by nonaligned nations, even if it might seem weak in comparison to
the text drafted by Western nations. A text that would be sponsored by
15. Ibid., p. 131.
16. Ibid., p. 132.
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the nonaligned nations would have the immense advantage of assuring
an overwhelming majority, or possibly even creating a consensus. The
USSR and the other socialist bloc countries would not vote against a
resolution that had the support of the Third World. Argentina would risk
further isolating itself by voting against such a proposal. Consensus would
be important in assuring that the decision of the Commission would win
the approval and funding of the Economic and Social Council. A relatively
weak proposal passed by consensus might have a better chance of being
implemented successfully than a relatively strong text passed by a bare
majority. Overall, it seemed easier and more effective for the West to try
to upgrade a nonaligned proposal than to attempt to find enough votes
for a Western proposal.
This approach meant that the Western countries, and the United
States in particular, would have to yield the leadership on the issue of
disappearances to a Third World country. The loss of control had to be
real. Not only would it be difficult to convince a Third World country to
assume the role of a speaker for the Western group, any ruse would be
transparent and fail to get the necessary votes. No Western country
would be allowed as a cosponsor. They would be free to lobby, as any
country would be, for changes in the Third World draft, but their control
would be greatly reduced. There was little-choice: a strong Western draft
might be defeated and the Argentine draft passed.
The Iraqi Proposal
Iraq, with the help of Cuba, drew up a proposal which became the
focus of the discussion among countries throughout the fourth week.
After making some changes that Iraq accepted, the United States, and
finally the other Western countries, accepted the draft. It provided for a
working group of five of the Commission members in their own capacities
(instead of three independent experts) to be appointed for just one year
(instead of an indefinite time period). The working group was to examine
the question of enforced or involuntary disappearances of persons. The
United States succeeded in persuading Iraq to agree to extend the working
group's mandate to examine the question of "cases of" enforced or in-
voluntary disappearances. This would ensure that the working group could
respond to individual cases and not just study the problem of disap-
pearances in general. The United States also added a provision allowing
"humanitarian organizations and others" to provide information to the
working group which would not only allow NGOs to provide information
but other organizations and individuals as well. No attempt was made to
define what a disappeared person was; presumably, that would be left to
the working group to decide.
U.N. Commission on Human Rights
On Wednesday, February 27, Iraq took the resolution, as amended,
back to the other nonaligned countries. Several countries were in favor of
it. Other countries reacted neutrally or even unfavorably, but were in-
terested in avoiding a situation in which the nonaligned bloc would be
split down the middle. Cuba, for instance, saw itself as a leader of the
entire group of nonaligned countries, because of its position as Chair of
the Bureau of the nonaligned group of nations. If a consensus on the
disappearances issue could not be found and nonaligned countries split
their votes, Cuba would necessarily have to end up supporting the position
of some nonaligned countries and opposing that of others. This situation
it wanted to avoid. Yugoslavia, fearing that the USSR would be inclined
to side with Argentina if the issue came to a vote, also wanted to assure a
consensus. The result was that the amendment suggested by the United
States-that the working group was to consider cases or individual persons
-was deleted. The language now read that the working group was to
respond effectively to urgent situations, not cases.
Intense Negotiations
Frantic lobbying efforts followed. The United States was unwilling to
accept the language as changed, but time had run out. The luxury of
having a formal meeting of the Western bloc or nonaligned bloc was no
longer available. The vote, scheduled to take place on Friday, Febru-
ary 29, was only hours away. It had already been postponed several times,
and could be postponed no longer. Iraq accepted the U.S. language
dealing with individual cases, but all the other delegates had to be found
and their agreement secured if there was any hope of achieving consensus.
Delegates stepped up their pace, searching each other out, yelling,
cajoling, and pleading. At times representatives of twenty to thirty dif-
ferent countries, or a majority of the Commission, could be seen in the
hallways debating among themselves. The language that spoke in terms
of "cases" was simply not acceptable to all the delegates.
The United States, seeing that "cases" was not acceptable, decided to
lobby for a different set of words. It now proposed that instead of
providing that the working group "examine the question of enforced or
involuntary disappearances of persons" which could be interpreted as a
mandate to study the question in abstract terms only, the language should
provide that the working group "examine questions relating to enforced
or involuntary disappearances of persons [Emphasis added]." The change
was slight-only three words-and therefore acceptable to nearly all
delegations, yet it seemed to tip the balance in favor of letting the
working group respond to individual cases. At least, if the working group
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chose to do so, no one could dispute that it was not functioning within its
mandate.
Another frantic round of lobbying followed. Up until nearly the time
of the vote, the United States adamantly insisted on adding to the resolu-
tion the words "questions relating to." All delegations were persuaded or
pressured into agreeing to the amendment. It cannot be doubted that the
position of the United States as a superpower and leader of the Western
nations certainly helped its negotiating position, but the determination
and insistence that the U.S. delegates brought into their one-to-one talks
with other delegates were significant. The United States had given up
control over the disappearances resolution in order to assure its passage;
it then fought hard to strengthen it as much as politically possible.
Argentina was desperately trying to destroy the delicate agreement
that had been reached by the Western, nonaligned, and socialist nations.
It cabled to the governments of the delegates leading the consensus-in-
cluding Iraq and the United States-and complained bitterly that the
delegates of these countries were conducting a vicious vendetta against
Argentina. The delegates were then contacted by their governments and
had to explain that there had been no attack against Argentina at all.
Argentina also planned to introduce a dozen different amendments to
the resolution on disappearances hoping to delay the debate, weaken the
proposal, and destroy any possibility of a single overwhelming vote in
favor of the resolution.
Return to Public Debate
On 29 February 1980 after one week of tense negotiations, the public
debate resumed. The galleries were again packed with the relatives of the
disappeared who had come to make sure that the plight of their family
members was not ignored.
The countries that had agreed on the proposal on disappearances
had also agreed on a plan of debate. According to Commission procedure,
the only proposal that could be the subject of debate was the French
proposal, as it was the only one that had been submitted in time. There-
fore, France would agree to accept any amendments proposed by Iraq.
Iraq would essentially introduce a new proposal as an amendment to the
French resolution. Algeria would propose the three words, "questions
relevant to," and Nigeria would give its support to this U.S. wording.
Finally, Iraq would move that the resolution be adopted without a vote,
in order to preserve an appearance of unanimity; those countries who
might abstain or vote "no" in a roll call vote would not have their position
recorded if the measure was passed without a vote. The only uncertain
U.N. Commission on Human Rights
factor'was how effective Argentina would be in introducing and passing
its amendments.
The representative of Iraq spoke first, introducing his proposal: 17 The
delegate pleaded that politics should not be involved in the question of
disappearances. His concern was to carry out the duty of the Human
Rights Commission in regard to human rights and to avoid emotional
attacks on any countries. He expressed the view that his proposal-co-
sponsored by Iraq, Cyprus, Yugoslavia, and Senegal (later Iran and Costa
Rica were added)-was the best possible compromise between the various
versions other countries had put forward. Not all countries agreed with it,
but he hoped there would not be "a problem to deal with it." He moved
to adopt the resolution without a vote.
Algeria spoke next. The delegate underlined the objective character
of the mechanism being created and introduced the U.S. amendment,
adding the words "questions relevant to" enforced or involuntary disap-
pearances. Nigeria spoke simply to give its support to the amendment.
France enthusiastically endorsed the Iraqi proposal and the amendment.
The Argentine forces then made their move. Brazil agreed with the
proposal and the amendment, but wanted to make one small modifica-
tion. It proposed an amendment that limited the Sub-Commission to
making only general recommendations to the Human Rights Commission.
The unamended text did not specify whether the recommendations by
the Sub-Commission were to be general or specific thereby allowing the
Sub-Commission to make specific recommendations concerning individ-
ual cases. The Brazilian amendment would bar the Sub-Commission from
making recommendations on individual cases.
Uruguay spoke after Brazil, and although stating it was in favor of a
consensus, proposed another amendment. It pointed out that there was
no provision by which a government under investigation by the proposed
working group might present its own case to the Human Rights Commis-
sion. It insisted that the working group on disappearances should not be
able to present its conclusions to the Commission if the government
being investigated had no chance to make its own presentation to the
Commission. At the least, there should be a provision providing for
simultaneous presentations by both the working group and the govern-
ment. It had no specific language prepared but asked that the debate be
delayed until it had a chance to consult with other nations on the issue.
Iraq then asked for the floor again. The delegate spoke in favor of the
Brazilian amendment, but asked Uruguay to withdraw its proposed
amendment. Agreement had been reached among all the countries, the
time was late, and all countries had been consulted. The Chairman
17. Ibid., p. 141.
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strongly supported Iraq's request to Uruguay. He pointed out that there
had been many days of negotiations and he pleaded with everyone to
cooperate. Uruguay could, of course, insist on the amendment if that is
what it wanted to do, but Uruguay was strenuously urged to withdraw it.
Had Uruguay pressed forward, the consensus might very well have broken
down. Instead, Uruguay, although complaining that it had not been
consulted regarding Iraq's proposal, withdrew its amendment.
THE ADOPTED PROPOSAL
The proposal, as amended, was then adopted without a vote. The pre-
ambular paragraphs, as proposed by France, remained the same. The
operative paragraphs, however, were entirely replaced:
1. Decides to establish for a period of one year a Working Group consisting
of five of its members, to serve as experts in their individual capacities, to
examine questions relevant to enforced or involuntary disappearances of
persons;
2. Requests the Chairman of the Commission to appoint the members of
the group;
3. Decides that the Working Group, in carrying out its mandate, shall seek
and receive information from governments, intergovernmental organizations,
humanitarian organizations and other reliable sources;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to appeal to all governments to co-
operate with and assist the Working Group in the performance of its tasks
and to furnish all information required;
5. Further requests the Secretary-General to provide the Working Group
with all necessary assistance, in particular staff and resources they require in
order to perform their functions in an effective and expeditious manner;
6. Invites the Working Group, in establishing its working methods, to bear
in mind the need to be able to respond effectively to information that comes
before it and to carry out its work with discretion;
7. Requests the Working Group to submit to the Commission at its thirty-
seventh session a report on its activities, together with its conclusions and
recommendations;
8. Further requests the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities to continue studying the most effective means
for eliminating enforced or involuntary disappearances of persons, with a
view to making general recommendations to the Commission at its thirty-
seventh session;
9. Decides to consider this question again at its thirty-seventh session
under a sub-item entitled "Question of Missing and Disappeared Persons."
The battle over the meaning of the proposal immediately began. In
explaining their position after the adoption of the resolution, the USSR,
U.N. Commission on Human Rights
Argentina, and Ethiopia urged a restrictive reading of the resolution. 18
The USSR, for instance, pointedly referred to the fact that the working
group had been created for one year only. It presumed that the group
would work by strict consensus and that the duration of any meetings
would be limited. It saw no need for the group to meet at all until two to
three weeks before the 1981 session of the Human Rights Commission.
A reading that would allow the working group to consider individual
cases of disappearance was urged by the U.S., Australia, Cyprus, Nether-
lands, and Canada. The United States specifically pointed out that the
mandate of the working group of experts would allow it to consider the
thousands of individual cases in existence. The general feeling of the
Commission was that the working group would establish its own working
methods and would be able, if it so chose, to investigate individual cases.
The United States, in its speech after the vote, joined the Iraqi resolu-
tion as a cosponsor, because it could not have politically been a co-
sponsor beforehand, but the United States wanted to be associated with
the adopted resolution.
The fight over who would be selected as members of the working
group began even before the resolution passed. By the end of the Com-
mission on 14 March 1980 the choices had been made. Following the
accepted requirement of geographical distribution, the working group
members chosen were the representatives of Iraq, 19 Costa Rica, United
Kingdom, Ghana, and Yugoslavia. The general feeling among the dele-
gates of the Commission was that this selection could lead to an effective
working group.
PROGRESS REPORT
Having had its budget and authorizing resolution approved by the U.N.
Economic and Social Council, the Working Group on Enforced or Involun-
tary Disappearances gathered a small staff, met for a week in mid-June,
and reviewed information made available by governments, the Interna-
tional Labour Office, the European Commission on Human Rights, and
nongovernmental organizations, such as Amnesty International, the Inter-
national Commission of Jurists, the International Federation of Human
Rights, the International League for Human Rights, and the World Council
of Churches. The Working Group found fifteen countries from various
18. Ibid., p. 142-44.
19. Ironically, the representative of Iraq later resigned from the working group. Apparently,
his government was displeased by the progressive role he played during the Commission
session.
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parts of the world as deserving particular concern.20 Although the Working
Group's report was not available until after January 1981, it appeared
at this writing to be a general study analagous to the excellent Report
of the Expert on the Question of the Fate of the Missing and Disap-
peared Persons in Chile,21 which will consider the causes of, the con-
text of, and possible measures to deal with the phenomenon of dis-
appearances. The Working Group has also apparently developed a com-
puterized list of persons who have been reported as disappeared, which is
analogous to the lists of missing persons prepared by the International
Committee of the Red Cross and submitted regularly by the ICRC to
governments. In addition, the Working Group has attempted to focus
immediate attention on several countries where disappearances continue
to occur.22 Few countries, however, appear to be cooperating with the
Working Group. After meeting for a second time in mid-September 1980,
the Working Group is evidently copsidering the possibility of direct
contacts and visits to some countries, but only one country has indicated
its willingness to invite the Working Group.
While the Working Group has begun to function, a number of other
U.N. bodies have maintained a high level of attention on the problem of
disappearances. The World Conference of the United Nations Decade
for Women expressed grave concern in its resolution 23 at the increasing
number of missing and disappeared persons, including women and
children. The Sixth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime
and Treatment of Offenders referred in August 1980 to the connection
between extrajudicial executions and disappearances. The Sub-Commis-
sion on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities adopted
an extensive resolution on 11 September 1980, which urged the Commis-
sion on Human Rights to extend the mandate of its Working Group on
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, urged the Secretary-General to
use his good offices in urgent disappearance cases, and decided to find
ways of undertaking speedy investigations of disappearances with a view
toward protecting informants, publicizing findings when a government
refuses to cooperate, and developing other emergency measures.23 The
1980 General Assembly will almost certainly pass a resolution expressing
continued concern about disappearances and the anguish of the relatives
of people who disappear, welcoming the advent of the Working Group,
urging the Secretary-General to use his good offices, and asking govern-
ments to cooperate with the Working Group.
20. United Nations, Press Release no. HR/1945, 13 June 1980.
21. Economic and Social Council, Official Records Suppl. 3 (A/34/583/Add.1) 1979.
22. United Nations, Press Release no. HR/967, 19 September 1980.
23. Economic and Social Council, Committee on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (1.756) 1980.
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CONCLUSION
From the efforts of the Working Group established by the Human Rights
Commission, other U.N. bodies, and interested organizations, it is clear
that disappearances remain an extremely important and yet very difficult
problem for which no single measure or group of measures appears
adequate.24 It is unclear whether the Secretary-General has sufficiently
used his good offices and his immense influence to focus on the problem
of disappearances and to assure that governments cooperate with the
Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances. It also ap-
pears that the Working Group may not have given adequate attention to
making direct contacts with responsible governments. Studies and lists
may be useful, but some more particularized pressures from the United
Nations must be exerted, if lives are to be saved.
However, the passage of the Human Rights Commission resolution
on disappearances represents an exemplary act of negotiation and di-
plomacy. Concern for the effective protection of human rights predomi-
nated-if only for a moment-over political considerations. The Commis-
sion has taken the first important step toward finding an international
approach to the difficult problem of disappearances.
24. Some guidance for future work on the phenomenon of disappearances was provided
by a seminar held in late June 1980. The results of the conference will be published in
1981 by Amnesty International.
